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Abstract 
The Early Warning System for the principle of subsidiarity gives national parliaments the right to submit 
a reasoned opinion if they think that an EU proposal does not comply with the subsidiarity principle, 
but it seems that national parliaments use the provision rather as a political tool than a tool to 
guarantee proper allocation of competences between the EU and the member states. This study 
considers the motivation behind the use of the EWS by investigating the variation in length among the 
reasoned opinions. The results suggest that extensive reasoned opinions are likely to be the result of 
policy- and vote-seeking behavior, implying that the use of the EWS is not a purely constitutional, 
apolitical affair. However, there also seem to be signs that national parliaments in the EWS behave 
according to a logic of appropriateness. 
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Introduction 
For decades, politicians and academics have been trying to cure the EU from its democratic deficit but, 
as the Brexit seems to indicate, to no avail. The absence of national parliamentary influence in the 
European policymaking process has come to be among the foremost questions in the debate over the 
EU’s democratic substance. National parliaments are, after all, the traditional sources of democratic 
legitimacy. Admittedly, the establishment of the EU implied a transfer national parliamentary powers 
to their governments and to the institutions at the EU level. However, “the victims of European 
integration have learned to fight back” (Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea, 2015). They have gradually 
expanded their involvement in EU affairs in various ways, for example by creating specialized 
committees that monitor EU affairs and by tightening control on the negotiating positions of their 
governments (Winzen, 2012). Moreover, to translate the democratic legitimacy of national 
parliaments to the EU stage, the member states agreed to include a number of provisions in the Lisbon 
Treaty, of which the early warning system (EWS) for the principle of subsidiarity is the most far-
reaching. It provides the national parliaments, for the first time, with a direct, ex ante, yet collective, 
role in the European policy process. 
The EWS enables national parliaments to review the compliance of an EU draft legislative act 
with the principle of subsidiarity, which states that the EU is competent to legislate only if it is able to 
act more effectively than the member states (Article 5.3 Treaty on the European Union (TEU)). If a 
national parliament thinks that a proposal infringes the subsidiarity principle, it may, within eight 
weeks, respond to it by submitting a written complaint, called a reasoned opinion. If sufficient 
reasoned opinions are submitted regarding a single proposal, the Commission is compelled to review, 
and to either maintain, amend, or withdraw the proposal. This procedure is also known as the yellow 
card procedure. 
Formally, national parliaments may use the EWS only to safeguard the respect for the division 
of competences between the EU and its member states (Groen and Christensen, 2015: 47). However, 
it seems that national parliaments submit reasoned opinions for other purposes as well. The EWS is 
used quite actively – about 500 proposals have been sent to the national parliaments, which, in turn, 
submitted about 300 reasoned opinions. This is surprising, as the Commission’s legislative proposals 
are generally compliant with the principle of subsidiarity (Fraga, 2005: 497; Raunio, 2010: 6; Kiiver, 
2012: 3).  
Equally curious is the content of these reasoned opinions. Formally, the EWS allows for a 
review on issues regarding subsidiarity stricto sensu (Hettne, 2014: 3). It follows that reasoned opinions 
may contain only arguments underpinning statements to the effect that (1) national member states 
themselves are sufficiently able to achieve the goals of the proposed directive, and that (2) 
intervention by means of an EU legislative act is not more effective in achieving these goals 
(Ambtenbrink and Vedden, 2010: 168). Any arguments that do not have their origin in Article 5.3 TEU 
should be channeled through the Political Dialogue or the governments (Cooper, 2016: 19, 23). Thus, 
the range of valid arguments is very limited and reasoned opinions are therefore expected to be 
concise.  
In practice, however, many reasoned opinions are more extensive than expected, covering a 
wide range of arguments, many of which are rather related to the other founding principles of the EU 
– the principle of conferral of competences and the principle of proportionality (Kiiver, 2012: 97-101; 
Hettne, 2014; Cooper, 2016). Some chambers even seem to consider the EWS an invitation to co-
legislate, that is, to discuss the content and the political merits of proposals in great detail. They even 
put forward specific amendments to the text or concrete recommendations for their improvement 
(Kiiver, 2012: 137-138; Hettne, 2014: 7; Cooper, 2016: 13-17). 
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The most recent yellow card procedure illustrates the remarkable way in which the EWS is 
used. In May 2016 14 chambers from 11 member states drew a yellow card as a response to the 
Commission’s proposal to revise the Posted Workers directive. Apparently, 27 chambers from 17 
member states did not object to it on grounds of subsidiarity infringement. This makes sense. The rules 
on posting of workers are directly related to the EU’s fundamental freedom of movement for workers 
principle, typically a topic demanding supranational attention. Hence it is difficult to justify a breach of 
the subsidiarity principle. Naturally, the reasoned opinions that have nevertheless been submitted 
contain arguments that go beyond the principle of subsidiarity.1  
What explains the way national parliaments make use of the early warning system for the 
principle of subsidiarity? Previously, it was thought that national parliaments use the EWS according 
to their institutional capacity, but the aforementioned striking features of the use of the EWS signal 
that more is going on. They seem to indicate that national parliaments use the EWS for political, rather 
than apolitical, constitutional reasons. Intuitively, this perfectly makes sense. National parliaments are 
political entities and, unlike a French-like Conseil Constitutionnel or Conseil d’Etat, not legal entities (cf. 
Kiiver, 2012). They seek to maximize their votes and their effect on public policy (Strøm, 1990). Hence, 
it would not be surprising if they use the EWS accordingly, considering the EWS a political tool.  
So far, only a few studies have focused on the strategic potential of the EWS (Gattermann and 
Hefftler, 2015; Williams, 2016; Miklin, 2016; Cooper, 2012; 2016). They were devoted to the 
identification of the factors that influence the issuance of reasoned opinions, leaving the reasoned 
opinions themselves largely untouched. Hence, we know very little about the ‘politics of subsidiarity.’ 
The present study is an explanatory, theoretically informed, empirical work of research, aimed at 
better understanding of the use of the EWS. Contrary to previous research, it focuses on the variation 
among reasoned opinions in terms of their length, as the length of a reasoned opinion too may tell us 
something about the motivation for its submission: the longer a reasoned opinion, the more likely it is 
that it is politically motivated, i.e. that it has been submitted to accommodate policy preferences or to 
satisfy the electorate. The results of this study also contribute to our knowledge of the role of national 
parliaments in the EU and the size of the EU’s putative democratic deficit.  
In the next section the literature on the use of the EWS by national parliaments is reviewed, 
followed by the formulation of the hypotheses concerning the politics of subsidiarity. Subsequently, it 
is examined whether the observed pattern of associations is indicative of policy- and vote-seeking 
behavior in the EWS. Based on data concerning the reasoned opinions that have been submitted by 
national parliaments from the EWS’ inception in 2010 through 2013, the findings suggest that national 
parliaments, as expected, appear to be more than mere guardians of the subsidiarity principle. This 
implies that their role in the EU is bigger than presumed, that the EWS may be achieving its original 
goal of increasing the EU’s democratic legitimacy better than intended, and that the size of the EU’s 
alleged democratic deficit may not be as obvious as previously believed. However, there also seem to 
be signs that the use of the EWS proceeds not entirely according to a strategic plan, but in part also 
according to a logic of appropriateness. 
 
Literature review 
Researchers have started to study the determinants of the use of the EWS. The majority of these 
studies focus on the capacity of national parliaments. These studies suggest for instance that the use 
of the EWS is affected by the time constraint imposed by the EWS’s deadline for the submission of 
reasoned opinions (Knutelská, 2011), inter-parliamentary coordination problems (Neuhold, 2011; 
Cooper, 2012) and the size of parliamentary administrations (Högenauer and Neuhold, 2013). These 
                                                          
1 See also a recently published analysis of the latest yellow card procedure by Martijn Scholten on http://www.montesquieu-
instituut.nl/id/vk53iylfhkxq/gele_kaart_overtreding_of_schwalbe 
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explanations cannot explain why national parliaments submit reasoned opinions against proposals 
that comply with the principle subsidiarity. Nor can they explain the subsidiarity-transcending content 
of many reasoned opinions. The need arose to study the incentives for submitting reasoned opinions 
(Raunio, 2009). 
Soon after this call, the idea that the submission of reasoned opinions is politically motivated 
came into vogue. The idea that national parliaments, suited to play politics, use the EWS for political 
purposes perfectly makes sense. They consist of political parties that seek to maximize the chances of 
re-election and their effect on public policy (Strøm, 1990). Political parties may pursue policy goals 
because they sincerely care about the policies in question, or as a means to obtain votes (Budge and 
Laver, 1986). Electoral support, in turn, helps them realizing other objectives, such as policy influence 
(Strøm and Müller, 1999: 11). It is likely that policy- and vote-seeking political parties consider the EWS 
as part of the structure of political opportunities. 
So far, only a few studies have focused on the strategic potential of the EWS, but the results 
all point in the same direction. Empirical evidence has been put forward that indicates that national 
parliaments use the EWS for reasons that go beyond guarding proper allocation between the member 
states and the EU, and that the submission of reasoned opinions is a consequence of the vote-seeking 
and policy-seeking behavior of national political parties (Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015; Cooper, 2012; 
2016; Miklin, 2016; Williams, 2016).  
The existing literature focuses on the determinants of the submission of reasoned opinions. 
The variation among reasoned opinions has not been the subject of systematic investigation, although 
this is potentially very insightful. Some reasoned opinions are very short whereas other reasoned 
opinions are very extensive. The length of a reasoned opinion may tell us something about the 
motivation for its submission. The content of a reasoned opinion which submission is based on a 
sincere belief that a proposal violates the principle of subsidiarity is, perforce, brief. After all, the 
principle of subsidiarity stricto sensu leaves little room for an extensive plea. Extensive reasoned 
opinions are probably extensive because they contain arguments that transcend the subsidiarity 
question as a consequence of vote- and policy-seeking behavior. Thus, the longer a reasoned opinion, 
the more likely it is that it is politically motivated, i.e. that it has been submitted to accommodate 
policy preferences or to satisfy the electorate. 
Parliamentary behavior regarding EU affairs has been mapped. Some parliaments are known 
for their attempts to influence the content of EU policy (Auel et al., 2015: 80-82; Neuhold and Smith, 
2015: 678). The more extensive reasoned opinions are likely the result of the attempts of these 
parliaments. At first sight, this seems irrational considering that the Commission, which insists that the 
EWS should be confined to the principle of subsidiarity, dismisses any reasoned opinion that departs 
too much from it. It is true that reasoned opinions are formally addressed to the Commission. In 
practice, however, parliaments may intent to instruct their government, via which accommodation of 
their or electorate’s policy preferences is more likely. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Extensive reasoned opinions are likely to be filed by parliaments that are known for their 
policy-seeking behavior in the context of EU affairs. 
 
In line with the idea that public opinion functions as a thermostat (Wlezien, 1995), previous research 
indicates that policy-makers react to aggregate public attitudes towards the EU. Toshkov (2011), for 
example, finds that public support for European integration has an effect on EU policy output (but no 
strong evidence for causation in the opposite direction). Public Euroscepticism and the submission of 
reasoned opinions also appear to be related (Williams, 2016). Although no conclusive causal claims 
can be made, it is argued that national parliaments may use the EWS to show their electorate that it is 
critically dealing with EU affairs (Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015: 308; Williams, 2016). It then becomes 
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also possible that reasoned opinions are neither intended as a message to the Commission, nor to 
instruct the executive, but to show a Eurosceptic electorate that EU affairs are critically dealt with. 
Accordingly, the more extensive reasoned opinions are likely the result of vote-seeking parliaments 
hoping to gain political support of Eurosceptic voters as an award for their EU scrutiny. 
The plausibility of this statement may be questioned for the reason that most citizens are 
probably not aware of the existence of the EWS and its use by their representatives, let alone that they 
get to read a reasoned opinion (if they would want this at all). Would it not be highly improbable that 
chambers use the EWS to show their electorate that EU affairs are critically dealt with? Perhaps. But 
given that national parliaments are representative samples of their electorate regarding ideology, it is 
still plausible that extensive reasoned opinions are likely to be filed by parliaments in Eurosceptic 
member states. Eurosceptic parliaments may consider the EWS an opportunity to oppose further 
European integration (Auel et al., 2015). They may pre-eminently be the ones to formulate extensive 
reasoned opinions, as they are likely to oppose EU policy on more grounds than a breach of the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Extensive reasoned opinions are likely to be filed by parliaments in a Eurosceptic member 
state. 
 
The concept of salience denotes the importance a national parliamentary chamber attaches to 
an issue, which may be based on, among other things, its (expected) policy impact, its political 
sensitivity, or the attention it receives from relevant constituencies (Warntjen, 2011: 167). The salience 
of a proposal thus reinforces the incentives of policy influence and electoral success that motivate 
parliamentary behavior. Accordingly, the saliency of EU affairs has proven to be a strong predictor of 
parliamentary scrutiny in general (Saalfeld, 2005). It has also been shown that national parliaments 
are more likely to submit reasoned opinions if proposals are about salient issues (Gattermann and 
Hefftler, 2015). In addition, it is expected that the salience of proposals is also associated with the 
length of a reasoned opinion. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Reasoned opinions are more extensive if the draft legislative act concerns a salient issue. 
Critical readers may wonder why national parliaments would advance their political interests by means 
of the EWS at all. Considering the ways at the domestic level parliaments can do this, would it not be 
relatively inefficient and ineffective trying to influence EU policy by means of a reasoned opinion? This 
depends on the institutional strength of national parliaments. Their institutional strength reinforces 
the incentives to use the EWS to pursue their political interests to a more or a lesser extent (Auel et 
al., 2015; Cooper, 2016). For institutionally strong parliaments, the EWS is likely to be a subordinate 
instrument for achieving policy influence and electoral success. For institutionally weak parliaments it 
may not be irrational to use a not so obvious instrument as the EWS. They may use it to compensate 
for their institutional weakness. 
In the multilevel context of the EU, national parliaments vary in their strength relative to their 
governments. Their strength depends in the first place on the instruments they have at their disposal 
to shape their government’s negotiation positions. Scrutiny systems differ greatly. Some have 
advantageous instruments to influence the government’s negotiation position; others have less 
advantageous instruments. For instance, all parliaments can, in principle, issue mandates, but some 
mandates are non-binding, whereas others are (quasi-)binding or allow for deviation but only under 
certain conditions (Winzen, 2012: 661). National parliaments which can bind the government legally 
to their position tend to be stronger than those that can only issue a non-binding opinion. Equally 
important to the instruments are good access to information and a favorable scrutiny infrastructure 
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to deal with this information (Auel et al., 2015). Therefore, it was previously assumed that 
institutionally strong parliaments would be most likely to extend their influence to the EU level, for 
example by participating in the EWS. This hypothesis has been refuted recently.  
Then it was suggested that institutionally weak national parliaments use the EWS to 
compensate for their inferior scrutiny systems. Institutionally strong parliaments are likely to have less 
incentives to use the EWS to advance their political interests, because they are able to effectively make 
use of other means in their scrutiny systems which have been arranged especially for this purpose. For 
institutionally weak national parliaments, however, the EWS may be an excellent opportunity to 
advance their policy goals. Surprisingly, the results of a recent study suggest that institutional strength 
does not have a significant effect on the issuance of reasoned opinions (Auel et al., 2015: 86). 
There is, however, sufficient reason to expect that institutional strength has an effect on the 
length of reasoned opinions. Reasoned opinions may contribute to the government’s awareness of the 
parliament’s position. They may also bind a government to the parliament’s position. In Sweden, for 
example, reasoned opinions are politically binding because they are discussed prior to Council 
meetings. In Austria, governments are even bound legally to reasoned opinions, because they are 
combined with a mandate that is legally binding (Mastenbroek, Zwaan, Groen, Meurs, Reiding, 
Dörrenbächer and Neuhold, 2014: 21). Hence, national parliamentary chambers with an overall 
inferior scrutiny system may use the EWS to pursue their policy- and vote-related interests. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Extensive reasoned opinions are likely to be filed by institutionally weak parliaments. 
Whether national parliaments use the EWS to advance their political interests is also likely to 
be dependent on government composition (Saalfeld, 2005; Raunio, 2009: 322; Gattermann and 
Hefftler, 2015). National parliaments under a majority government are unlikely to use the EWS to 
advance their political interests. The preferences of the executive are aligned with those of the 
legislative majority, because this legislative majority has composed the government (Pahre, 1997: 
148). Moreover, it has composed its government to advance its preferences. Policy influence and 
electoral success therefore cease to be incentives for the parliamentary majority, whereas the 
opposition is generally not able to achieve an agreement due to its weaker position (Fraga, 2005: 498). 
Hence it is argued that national parliaments under a majority government are less likely to issue a 
reasoned opinion (Cooper, 2012: 449; Raunio, 2009, 2010). Policy influence and electoral success may 
provide behavioral incentives for national parliaments under a minority government. Political parties 
are more likely to use the EWS to advance their political interests in cases where the government is 
weak in terms of seat share (Finke and Herbel, 2015), as is the case when national parliaments tolerate 
a minority government.  
However, the idea that national parliaments under a majority government submit less 
reasoned opinions because they are less incentivized to do so receives only weak and ambiguous 
empirical support (Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015: 319). Government composition may be a better 
predictor of the length of a reasoned opinion. It is expected that reasoned opinions from parliaments 
that support a majority government are not motivated by policy influence and electoral success, but 
driven by a sincere belief that a proposal infringes the subsidiarity principle. Hence it is expected that 
these reasoned opinions are concise.   
 
Hypothesis 5: Extensive reasoned opinions are likely to be filed by parliaments tolerating a minority 
government. 
 
Although the EWS may formally be used only to guard compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, it 
does enable national parliaments to advance their political interests. It is likely that they use the EWS 
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this way because this is what national parliaments do, after all: pursuing policy influence and electoral 
success. Such reasoned opinions are more extensive than reasoned opinions that have been filed from 
a sincere belief that a proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. A positive association 
between the policy-seeking status of a national parliament and the more extensive reasoned opinions 
could be interpreted as supportive of this idea. National parliaments representing a Eurosceptic 
electorate are also likely to use the EWS for political reasons. If these parliaments appear to submit 
longer reasoned opinions, the idea that the EWS serves political ends gains additional credibility. 
Policy- and vote-seeking incentives are likely to be reinforced in the case of a salient issue. Hence, 
reasoned opinions that have been submitted against salient proposals are expected to be extensive. 
Especially institutionally weak national parliaments are expected to consider the EWS an excellent 
opportunity to advance their political interests, as a way to complement their inferior scrutiny system. 
Institutionally strong national parliaments rather turn to other means to advance their political 
interests, because to them, the EWS is not the most obvious way to pursue policy influence and 
electoral success. It is expected that reasoned opinions filed by institutionally strong parliaments are 
concise, reflecting their sincere subsidiarity concerns. Reasoned opinions from national parliaments 
under a majority government are also expected to be short, because they are based on a sincere belief 
that a proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Generally, these governments are 
not divided, making the EWS appear to them not as the most obvious way to pursue political interests. 
 
Data and method 
The dependent variable of this study is the length of the 286 reasoned opinions that have been issued 
by the (chamber(s) of the) national parliaments in the period January 2010 to December 2013. The 
length of a reasoned opinion roughly indicates whether it is likely that a national legislature has used 
the EWS for political reasons - the longer a reasoned opinion, the likelier it is that its submission was 
politically driven. After all, reasoned opinions driven by sincere subsidiarity-concerns are necessarily 
concise, because Art. 5.3 TEU allows only for a limited number of arguments. 
To prevent cross-language influences, the words of the English translations of the reasoned 
opinions were counted. Most translated reasoned opinions were retrievable via IPEX, the platform for 
EU Interparliamentary Exchange.2 Missing reasoned opinions could in most instances be retrieved via 
the Commission’s Secretariat-General3 or the website of the respective national parliaments. Two 
reasoned opinions could not be found at all.4 If a translation was not available, Google’s free online 
language translation service was used to translate them. ATLAS.ti’s ‘Word Cruncher’ was used as it 
allows for counting words in both Word and PDF files. This was useful, because reasoned opinions may 
be available in both forms. Some reasoned opinions were available in .pdf-format, but concerned a 
scanned document. Adobe Acrobat X pro was used to convert such documents into intelligible .doc 
files. One reasoned opinion remained unintelligible nonetheless.5 Two reasoned opinions6 could not 
be converted because they were available only in secured .pdf-files. This led, perforce, to the exclusion 
of these reasoned opinions from the analysis. Altogether, five reasoned opinions are missing. Hence 
the overall N for the dependent variable is 281.  
Only the words that truly belong to a reasoned opinion were considered. Other content, such 
as appendices including translations, were excluded. The Commission receives the reasoned opinions 
in various forms, including reports, resolutions, letters, and motions. The length of the reasoned 
                                                          
2 http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/search.do 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm 
4 One concerns a reasoned opinion from the Latvian Saeima against COM(2012)35; the other concerns a reasoned opinion from the French 
Assemblée Nationale against COM(2011)560.  
5 This reasoned opinion was filed by the Dutch Tweede Kamer against COM(2010)379. 
6 These reasoned opinions were submitted by the Spanish Cortes Generales against COM(2013)296. 
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opinions does not vary by the form in which they appear. Figure 1 shows the positively skewed, 
leptokurtic distribution of the data. An average reasoned opinion counts 1128 words (red dashed line). 
The standard deviation (SD) is 888.43. The shortest reasoned opinion came from the French Sénat and 
counts 167 words, whereas the longest reasoned opinion, filed by the Czech Republic’s Poslanecká 
sněmovna, counts 6102 words. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 Distribution of the dependent variable 
 
 
The shortest reasoned opinion is a stranger in our midst. The French upper house usually submits 
reasoned opinions in the form of resolutions, accompanied by cover letters. This particular case seems 
to be only part of a cover letter. The missing parts could not be found in the databases of IPEX and the 
Commission’s Secretariat General, nor was it available on the website of the French Sénat.  
There is no particular reason, other than the hypothesized ones, which could explain the extraordinary 
size of the largest reasoned opinion from the Czech Republic’s lower house.  
The main independent variables of interest correspond to the hypotheses and are suited to 
examine whether national parliaments use the EWS as a political tool, i.e. to influence EU policy and 
to appeal to their electorate. To examine the first hypothesis regarding the accommodation of policy 
preferences via the government, the variable Policyshaper/government watchdog is included. 
Recently, parliamentary activity in EU affairs has been investigated for the first time in a comparative 
empirical study (Auel et al., 2015). It appears to vary in terms of intensity and type. Rozenberg and 
Hefftler (2015: 31-32) developed a taxonomy of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. Two types of 
parliaments are likely to use the EWS to accommodate their positions and public opinion during the 
negotiation process: policy shapers and government watchdogs. Policy shapers aim, imprimis, to 
influence the formulation of EU policies according to their interest; government watchdogs aim, above 
all, to accommodate public opinion from vote-seeking considerations (Rozenberg and Hefftler, 2015: 
31-32). Based on a systematic evaluation of the role of the national parliaments of all 28 member states 
since the Lisbon Treaty (Neuhold, Rozenberg, Smith and Hefftler (eds), 2015), Neuhold and Smith 
(2015: 675-683) categorized the national parliaments according to this typology. 
Policyshaper/government watchdog is a dummy variable based on this categorization. A parliament is 
assigned 0 if it is not known as a parliament seeking policy influence through the government; it is 
assigned 1 if it is a policy shaper or government watchdog. The categorization of national parliaments 
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is based on an analysis of lower houses only. Unfortunately, no comparable information on the 
reputation of upper houses is available. Hence, the variable is included only in models that consider 
lower houses only. Half of the unicameral parliaments and the lower houses are known as government 
watchdogs. Forty percent of the parliaments are policyshapers. Being a government watchdog does 
not preclude parliaments from being a policyshaper as well. Only five percent of the unicameral 
parliaments and the lower houses are not known as policyshapers or government watchdogs. This 
unfortunately implies that the variable suffers from little variation. Therefore, some caution is required 
when interpreting the results. 
Public Euroscepticism is the independent variable that is used to test the hypothesis that higher 
levels of aggregate public Euroscepticism in a member state result in the submission of more extensive 
reasoned opinions. European integration is a multifaceted process and so are attitudes towards the 
EU (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). For the purpose of this study, a variable is needed that fully captures 
the potential multidimensionality of EU attitudes rather than just one facet of public opinion towards 
the EU, such as the attitude towards membership, a specific policy, the speed of integration, 
enlargement, and trust in the most important EU institutions. In this study, Euroscepticism is conceived 
as encompassing a range of critical positions on European integration. Therefore, the variable Public 
Euroscepticism is operationalized using the following question from Eurobarometer surveys in the 
period 2009 to 2013: “In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, 
fairly negative or very negative image?”. Public Euroscepticism is measured as the percentage of 
individuals in each member state who have either a fairly negative or very negative image of the EU. 
Further, it is measured using the most recent Eurobarometer survey prior to the scrutiny deadline. For 
instance, draft legislative acts with a scrutiny deadline in the European semester running from June 
2012 to November 2012 were matched with public opinion from the Eurobarometer survey that was 
completed in May 2012. This variable was originally calculated by Williams (2016), but adapted for the 
purpose of this particular study. Theoretically, Public Euroscepticism can range from 0 to 100. In 
practice, Public Euroscepticism ranges from 8.10 (Poland in December 2010) to 59.64 (Cyprus in May 
2013), with a mean of 25.11 and a SD of 10.39. Lower values indicate electorates that are less 
Eurosceptic; higher levels indicate electorates that are more Eurosceptic. 
The validity of salience measures is often weak, even in the most renowned datasets such as 
the Comparative Manifesto Project datasets (Netjes and Binnema, 2007). Salience can be measured in 
several ways and different indicators usually yield different values (Warntjen, 2011). Ideally multiple 
measures are included to estimate the level of salience. Considering that the degrees of freedom drop 
with each additional variable, and taking into account that the effect of more variables needs to be 
examined, two salience-related variables are included. Taking into account the multidimensionality of 
the salience of an EU draft legislative act as much as possible, one variable relates to the actor-specific 
component of salience and the other to the issue-specific component. 
Firstly, the dummy variable New legislation is included. New legislation is likely to require 
substantial changes in national legislation in order to comply with the new legislation. Less substantial 
changes are introduced when a directive is recast, repealed or consolidated (De Ruiter, 2013: 1199). 
These required changes may not correspond to the chamber’s policy preferences and they may not 
appeal to the electorate. One third of the proposals concerns new legislation. The advantage of New 
legislation is that is generally accepted as a good indicator of issue salience (Warntjen, 2015; De Ruiter, 
2013). In addition, it is an indicator used in other studies of the use of the EWS by national parliaments 
(Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015). Including New legislation therefore contributes to the comparability 
of results from different studies.  
To increase the accuracy with which the concept of issue salience is measured a second dummy 
variable, Ordinary legislative procedure, is included. The ordinary legislative procedure is the standard 
procedure. To some proposals that have been transmitted to the parliaments for a subsidiarity test, 
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the assent procedure or the consultation procedure were applicable. These special legislative 
procedures are used for several very important decisions, including matters where the member states 
wish to retain more control and politically sensitive issues. The assent procedure and the consultation 
procedure were applied in one-fifth of the cases. The advantage of including this variable is that the 
data is easily retrieved from the EUR-Lex database. The disadvantage is that it is an indirect measure 
open to different interpretations (Warntjen, 2011: 173). Procedural aspects are often thought of being 
a consequence of the importance of a topic, but they may also be simply the consequence of a 
proposal’s legal base in the Treaties which determines the procedure to be applied. However, given 
that the adoption of the legal base of a proposal involves a choice, Ordinary legislative procedure is 
considered a qualified indicator of salience. 
The fact that New legislation and Ordinary legislative procedure are dummy variables implies 
that their variance is restricted. This problem (and the problems aforementioned) would be overcome 
if values were used based on different measures of salience (e.g. the number of recitals, media 
coverage and interviews). These measures are time- and labor-intensive. Given that the effect of 
salience on the length of a reasoned opinion is not central to this article, such measures would go 
beyond the purpose of this article. Hence, the general advice for interpreting the results of studies 
involving salience with caution applies. 
The variable Institutional weakness is based on the OPAL institutional strength score (Auel et 
al., 2015). As opposed to other rankings (e.g. Winzen, 2012; Karlas, 2012), the OPAL ranking includes 
all 28 EU-member states, it considers both upper and lower chambers separately, and it is based on an 
up-to-date set of indicators, that is indicators that have been adapted to the scrutiny systems that have 
changed over time. The institutional strength scores are based on three sets of indicators, or 
dimensions: oversight instruments, scrutiny infrastructure and access to information. For detailed 
information on the dimensions, indicators and measurement of institutional strength score, see Auel 
et al. (2015:66-71). The indicators were aggregated to an overall score and normalized on a scale of 0-
1. The values of the variable institutional weakness are based on the formula 1 – the institutional 
strength score. The strongest parliament is the Finnish Eduskunta (0.16); the weakest chamber is the 
Belgium Senaat/Sénat (0.84). The data is normally distributed, with a mean of 0.47 and an SD of 0.14. 
Majority government is the dummy variable that is used to test the hypothesis that the 
reasoned opinions of national parliaments tolerating a minority government (0) are likely to be more 
extensive than those submitted by national parliaments under a majority government (1). Caretaker 
governments are excluded from the analysis. Three-quarter of the reasoned opinions is filed by a 
national parliament supporting a majority government. Government survival usually depends on lower 
houses only, so the variable is not included in all models. 
In addition to the main independent variables, a number of control variables were included in 
the analysis. They are suited to examine the explanatory power of alternative hypotheses which are 
based on the idea that the use of the EWS is not a political decision, but for example dependent on 
capacity.  
The first alternative hypothesis is about the parliaments’ supporting staff. The Commission 
insists that the EWS should be confined to the principle of subsidiarity. Surprisingly, however, it is not 
clear what the principle of subsidiarity exactly entails. There are no guidelines for conducting 
subsidiarity checks. Above all, it is not clear whether this principle can be separated from two adjacent 
principles, the principle of conferral and the principle of proportionality (Kiiver, 2012; Cooper, 2016). 
The fact that the principle of subsidiarity is paired with the principle of proportionality in ‘Protocol No. 
2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality’ in the appendix of the 
TEU/TFEU, is illustrative. Consider also the connection between the principle of subsidiarity and the 
principle of conferral: if a proposal does not have a correct legal basis in the EU treaties, does it not, 
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by definition, violate the principle of subsidiarity? It seems that national parliaments need to be well 
equipped in order to filter the invalid arguments from the valid ones.  
The size of the parliamentary bureaucracy indicates how well equipped chambers are for the 
task of formulating reasoned opinions: the staff provides supporting tasks and is therefore an 
important part of a chamber’s capacity for action (Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). Therefore, the 
variable Bureaucratic size is included. National parliaments with a small bureaucracy may be more 
likely to file extensive reasoned opinions, containing arguments that are erroneously mistaken for valid 
arguments regarding the principle of subsidiarity. Parliaments with less capacity in terms of 
bureaucratic size may run into difficulties separating the invalid arguments from the valid ones. The 
length of the reasoned opinions may be determined by the capacity of the parliament that submitted 
it.   
The variable Bureaucratic size is based on the Interparliamentary Union’s (IPU) data on the 
absolute number of staff in unicameral parliaments, lower houses and upper houses.7 The Parlament 
ta’Malta has the smallest bureaucracy with 33 full time equivalent staff positions; the German 
Bundestag the largest with 2788 supporting employees working full-time. The data is somewhat 
positively skewed, with a mean of 675.42 and a SD of 508.42. The variable contains 27 missing cases, 
because the IPU’s dataset does not contain data on the staff supporting parliamentarians of the Irish 
Oireachtas and the Dutch Eerste Kamer. The variable is therefore not included in all models. 
Time constraints are also taken into account. The existing literature suggests that when time 
is short, national parliaments may fail to conduct subsidiarity checks in time (Knutelská, 2011: 335). 
However, empirical results suggest that many national parliaments file reasoned opinions despite time 
pressure (Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015). Yet it is important to include time constraints. Time 
constraints may affect the content of reasoned opinions. A reasoned opinion may be less extensive 
when time was short, because there was not enough time to thoroughly substantiate it. Or it may be 
more extensive, because writing a short story can be more difficult than writing a novel, thereby 
requiring more time. Chambers usually have eight weeks to submit a reasoned opinion, but qualify for 
extra time if summer recess intervenes this period. However, the Christmas break also causes 
suspension of proceedings, but it does not give occasion for extension of the deadline for reasoned 
opinions. Therefore, the dummy variable Christmas is included. Values of 1 indicate that the scrutiny 
period fell partially between 24 December and 1 January (Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015). 
In order to account for each national parliament’s experience working within the EU, the 
continuous variable Membership duration was included, measuring the duration in years of a country’s 
EU membership in a respective year. It is also possible that a reasoned opinion’s country of origin 
strongly affects its length. Therefore, a model was made including 40 dummy variables to account for 
the simple fact that a reasoned opinion has its origins in a specific member state. Sweden was chosen 
as the baseline. The Swedish Riksdag has, proportionately, provided most of the reasoned opinions. 
17 percent of the reasoned opinions registered in the dataset come from the Riksdag. The Riksdag also 
belongs to the group of countries which are responsible for the shortest reasoned opinions. An average 
Swedish reasoned opinion counts 641 words. The significant coefficients in the test model suggest that 
there is a need to control for reasoned opinions from the Czech Republic, Malta and Spain. Finally, the 
length of a reasoned opinion may vary by year. Perhaps the content and thus the length of a reasoned 
opinion has more to do with habituation to the new instrument than with incentives. Therefore, four 
year dummy variables were included. The year 2010 was chosen as the baseline. None of the 
coefficients were significant, so the year dummies have been excluded from subsequent models. 
 
 
                                                          
7 http://www.ipu.org/gpr-e/downloads/index.htm  
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TABLE 1 Summary of the hypotheses and their associated variables 
Factors Variables 
The accommodation of policy preferences via 
government 
Policyshaper/government watchdog 
Appealing to an Eurosceptic electorate Public Euroscepticism 
The salience of a proposal New legislation 
Ordinary legislative procedure 
Institutional weakness Institutional weakness 
Government composition Majority government 
Supporting staff Bureaucratic size 
Time constraints Christmas holidays 
Appropriateness Membership duration 
Member state Czech Republic 
Malta 
Spain 
 
 
 
The relationship between the various predictor variables and the dependent variable are explored by 
fitting a regression model to the data, based on the method of least squares. All predictor variables 
were rescaled into a 0-1 range according to the min-max normalization technique, in order to make 
comparison of their contribution and interpretation easier. The descriptive statistics after 
normalization are displayed in table 2. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics after normalization 
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Length of reasoned opinion 281 1128.21 888.43 167 6102 
Policy shaper/government watchdog 179 0.93 0.26 0 1 
Public Euroscepticism 281 0.33 0.20 0 1 
New Legislation 281 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Ordinary legislative procedure 281 0.82 0.39 0 1 
Institutional weakness 281 0.45 0.21 0 1 
Majority government 177 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Bureaucratic size 254 0.23 0.19 0 1 
Christmas 281 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Membership duration 281 0.48 0.38 0 1 
Czech Republic 281 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Malta 281 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Spain 281 0.06 0.25 0 1 
 
Results 
The models provided in table 3 on the next page serve to explain the variation in the length of the 
reasoned opinions that have been submitted by unicameral parliaments, lower houses, and upper 
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houses in the period 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013. Model 1 is based on all cases. Model 2 is 
based on data from unicameral parliaments and lower houses only, because it includes the variable 
Majority government and government survival is generally not dependent on upper houses. The 
variable Majority Government also contains 2 missing values due to the exclusion of caretaker 
governments. Hence, model 2 is based on 177 cases.  Model 3 is based on 254 cases due to the 
inclusion of the variable Bureaucratic size, which contains 27 missing cases. Model 4 contains 173 
cases, due to the missing values from the variables Bureaucratic Size and Majority government, and 
the exclusion of the reasoned opinions filed by upper houses. Models 5 to 8 are based on data from 
unicameral parliaments and lower houses only, not just because of the reasons aforementioned, but 
also because the values of the variable Policy shaper/government watchdog are based on the 
evaluation of the activities of unicameral parliaments and lower houses only. Exclusion of outliers and 
other potential too influential cases does not cause the results to deviate much from those displayed 
in table 3. Hence, the discussion is based on the results in table 3.  
 
Discussion 
It was expected that the more extensive reasoned opinions are filed by policy-seeking chambers, which 
attempt to accommodate their own preferences and those of the electorate on which they depend via 
their governments. Apart from the positive, significant coefficient of the variable Policy 
shaper/government watchdog in model 5, there is little to support this hypothesis. The models 6, 7 
and 8 show that, as soon as the variables Majority Government and Bureaucratic Size are added, the 
significance of the effect disappears. Thus, the results primarily show that a chamber’s reputation of 
trying to accommodate policy preferences through the government does not affect the length of a 
reasoned opinion. 
 Note that only five percent of the reasoned opinions was filed by a unicameral or lower house 
that is not known as a policy shaper or government watchdog. Low variation in the independent 
variable likely affects the quality of the analysis. Besides, the upper houses are not considered in the 
examination of this hypothesis, because no comparable information on their reputation was available. 
Drawing the conclusion that policy-seeking behavior has no effect on the length of a reasoned opinion 
would be premature, because the results are based on only half of the cases. On the other hand, to 
policyshapers and government watchdogs, accommodation of policy preferences through the 
government is so important, that it is likely that they have established more effective and efficient 
means to do so at the domestic level. Considering this, it does not seem surprising that being a 
policyshaper and/or a government watchdog is not a good predictor of the length of a reasoned 
opinion.  
The aggregated public opinion towards European integration in a member state is a better 
predictor of the length of a reasoned opinion. According to hypothesis 2 regarding political parties’ 
pursuit of electoral success, the results suggest that reasoned opinions are more extensive if they are 
filed by chambers in Eurosceptic member states. The positive coefficient of Public Euroscepticism 
remains significant across most models and can be interpreted as supportive of the idea that national 
parliaments use the EWS as a political tool. 
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It was expected that the length of a reasoned opinion depends on the salience of a proposal. 
The more salient a proposal, the more likely it is that a reasoned opinion is written to influence EU 
policy or to appeal to the electorate. That is, the more salient a proposal, the more extensive the 
reasoned opinion. However, the results do not support this argument. Previous studies indicate that 
the salience of a proposal determines whether it is likely that a parliament becomes active in the EWS, 
but for the content of a reasoned opinion, it does not seem to matter whether a proposal concerns 
new legislation or whether a special legislative procedure is applied. Considering the power of the 
hypothesis and the limitations of the way the salience of an EU draft legislative act was measured, it is 
suggested to enrich the analysis with salience-related variables based on different measures before 
drawing conclusions.   
It was also hypothesized that the more extensive reasoned opinions are likely to be filed by 
institutionally weak chambers, which use the EWS to compensate for their inferior scrutiny system. 
The results allow for this explanation. Although the coefficient of Institutional weakness is generally 
relatively large – implying that the institutional weakness of a parliament is an important predictor of 
the length of a reasoned opinion – its size is not constant across all models. It rather fluctuates 
according to a pattern. Institutional weakness appears to have a smaller effect after the inclusion of 
the variable Majority government. It was expected that a majority government would have a negative 
effect on the length of a reasoned opinion, but the results suggest that a majority government has a 
significant positive effect on the length of a reasoned opinion. The fact that the effect of institutional 
weakness drops whenever government composition is taken into account, combined with the 
unexpected direction of the effect of the presence of a majority government, may indicate that the 
variables interact.  
There was sufficient theoretical reason to explore the interaction effect. The Council (in its 
different configurations, and including its working parties and the Coreper) is a platform where the 
executives of the member states play a ‘two-level game’ (Pahre, 1997). Domestic politics can impose 
restrictions on the negotiator’s room for maneuver, which can be used for bargaining leverage during 
negotiations (Putnam, 1988). Governments can also make it look as if their hands are tied when it suits 
them. They may urge the national parliaments to express objections in a reasoned opinion, in order to 
support the government’s negotiation strategy. This way, national parliaments may function in the 
EWS as an extension of the government. It is not surprising that especially the institutionally weak 
parliaments in which the opposition parties constitute a minority, are sensitive to this kind of 
governmental opportunism. The idea that the government directs parliamentary activity in the EWS is 
not far-fetched. It has even been mentioned by parliamentarians and members of their supporting 
staff (Holzhacker, 2002: 470; Mastenbroek et al., 2014: 24). It just has not received any further 
attention. 
The QuantPsyc package was used to center the variables, and analyze the interaction between 
Majority government en Institutional weakness in the prediction of the length of a reasoned opinion. 
Overall, the results suggest that the reasoned opinions submitted by institutionally weak parliaments 
under a majority government tend to be longer than those submitted by institutionally strong 
parliaments under a majority government. For low institutional weakness (or institutionally strong 
parliaments), there was a significant increase in the length of the reasoned opinions submitted by 
national parliaments under a majority government, b = 645.53, 95% CI [250.82, 1040.24]. For average 
institutional weakness, there was a significant increase in the length of the reasoned opinions 
submitted by national parliaments under a majority government, b = 746.93, 95% CI [126.99, 1366.87]. 
This coefficient is larger, suggesting that the weaker the parliament under a majority government is, 
the longer its reasoned opinions. However, the increase in the length of the reasoned opinions 
submitted by very weak parliaments under a majority government, b = 848.33, 95% CI [-359.03, 
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2055.69], is not significant. Thus, the effect of the interaction between majority government and 
institutional weakness exists, but only to a certain extent. 
This means that the positive effect of the presence of a majority government needs additional 
explanation. A case study on EU scrutiny in the German Bundestag demonstrates that governing 
parties, driven by a concern over the survival of their government during a parliamentary period and 
their chances of re-election at the end of the period, may place EU matters under scrutiny with the 
aim to reinforce the negotiation position of the government, to protect it from making mistakes and 
from the opposition, and to make sure it acts in a due time (Holzhacker, 2002). It seems that 
governments not only demand assistance from their parliament by means of the EWS, but that 
parliaments may also, on its own initiative, use the EWS to assist their government. This may explain 
the unexpected positive effect of Majority government on the length of reasoned opinions. 
In none of the models does Christmas appear to be a significant predictor. This implies not only 
that the fact that a scrutiny period coincides with the Christmas holidays does not affect the length of 
a reasoned opinion. It also has a more general implication, namely that time constraints do not affect 
the length of a reasoned opinion. Previously, the remarkable use of the EWS has been primarily 
attributed to a chamber’s capacity in terms of, for example, time. This result can be interpreted as 
additional evidence that the use of the EWS depends on more than capacity. 
Another variable that was initially included to control for the effect of a chamber’s capacity is 
Bureaucratic size. It is impossible to overlook the influence of a chamber’s bureaucratic size on the 
length of a reasoned opinion. The size of the significant positive coefficient of Bureaucratic size 
suggests that the effect of a chamber’s supporting staff is not inferior to that of the institutional 
weakness of a chamber. Observing a negative effect on the length of a reasoned opinion would have 
been powerful support in favor of the parliamentary capacity hypothesis. However, the results indicate 
that the more extensive reasoned opinions come from the chambers that have a large bureaucratic 
apparatus. This can be explained as follows. A subsidiarity check requires human resources, but if a 
proposal is reviewed on more than just one aspect, such as proportionality or its political merits, or if 
concrete recommendations are to be made, it makes sense that additional human resources (i.e. a 
large bureaucratic apparatus) are needed. The capacity-related variable, originally included to control 
for the explanatory power of the institutional capacity hypothesis, appears to have an effect that can 
be interpreted as evidence in favor of the politics of subsidiarity idea. 
The relatively small yet significant, positive coefficient of Membership duration indicates that 
the more extensive reasoned opinions are associated with older member states. It is impossible to 
ignore the effect of membership duration, as it is robust across all models, but a rational explanation 
is not an obvious one. The explanation for the observation begins with the vagueness of the principle 
of subsidiarity. It is formulated in the Treaties at a highly abstract level. What is more, its scope is not 
demarcated so that it is almost indistinguishable from other principles. In addition, the Protocol does 
not provide any criteria for compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. Nor does it provide guidelines 
on what to include in a reasoned opinion. This encourages chambers from older member states to fall 
back on standard patterns of behavior for scrutinizing EU affairs. They formulate reasoned opinions in 
a way that is considered “natural, rightful, expected and legitimate” (see March and Olsen, 2004) 
within their scrutiny system. This likely transcends the principle of subsidiarity as their scrutiny systems 
are also not limited to checking compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. A certain degree of path-
dependence may also apply. Established ways of doing things may change, but incrementally, over 
time. It is suggested that this also applies to parliamentary scrutiny (Neuhold and Strelkov, 2012). The 
younger the member state, the less firmly established are the national parliamentary chamber’s 
scrutiny systems. What they consider natural, rightful, expected and legitimate does not depend so 
much on an existing scrutiny system that provides standard patterns of behavior. Instead, they may 
stick to what they think is strictly related to the principle of subsidiarity. This results in a shorter 
 Eline Burgers 
20 
reasoned opinion. The fact that membership duration has a significant positive effect on the length of 
a reasoned opinion may indicate that national parliaments in the EWS behave according to a logic of 
appropriateness. 
Turning to the final control variables, only the effect of having Czech roots is significant across 
all models. The very large positive significant coefficient of the Czech Republic dummy indicates that 
reasoned opinions from the Czech Republic tend to be much longer than those of other member states. 
The influence of having Czech (or Maltese or Spanish) roots does not undermine the effect of other 
variables, however.  
 
Conclusion 
What explains the way national parliaments make use of the early warning system for the principle of 
subsidiarity? The findings of recent studies on the issuance of reasoned opinions indicate that national 
parliamentary chambers do not only use the EWS according to their institutional capacity, but that it 
is also their interest in influencing policy and electoral success that motivates them to submit a 
reasoned opinion. The present analysis has provided a number of results that can also be interpreted 
as supportive of the idea that the reasoned opinions are politically motivated, instead of the result of 
a purely legal review that is done if institutional capacity allows it. However, there also seem to be 
signs that governments urge national parliaments to use the EWS in order to assist them. In addition, 
there seem to be signs that the use of the EWS by national parliaments is “overpatternized”. The way 
national parliaments use the EWS, including the variation among the reasoned opinions, are assumed 
to be the result of national parliaments pursuing influence over EU policy and electoral success. 
However, there is no universal guide of how to use the EWS, so national parliaments may use it 
according to how they think it should be used. In this light, it is not surprising that the use of the EWS 
by the national parliaments exhibits some peculiarities. 
Driven by the advantages of replication (Tsang and Kwan, 1999) and triangulation (Thurmond, 
2001), this study focused on the use of the EWS by national parliaments from a different angle. It is 
the first to investigate it by explaining the variation in length among reasoned opinions. The fact that 
the results are consistent with previous findings implies a more solid empirical foundation for the idea 
of the “politics of subsidiarity”. It contributed to the credibility needed to accept it with a comfortable 
degree of assurance.   
 In addition, the results of this study allow for extension of the theory on the use of the EWS by 
national parliaments. The current theory is that national parliamentary chambers use the EWS if their 
capacity allows for it and if it is in their interest, implying that we think that a logic of consequences 
explains the way national parliaments make use of the EWS. However, the fact that chambers from 
older member states submit longer reasoned opinions than chambers from younger member states 
seems to indicate that national parliamentary chambers may use the EWS also according to a logic of 
appropriateness. This raises questions about the intentions of national parliaments: do national 
parliaments make purposefully use of the EWS’s strategic potential?  
 Large-N studies are pre-eminently suitable for examining whether a pattern of associations fits 
with the theoretical predictions. National parliaments have a motive to use the EWS’s strategic 
potential and the results of large N-studies, including this one, indicate that they behave accordingly. 
However, these studies failed to shed light on the intent of national legislatures. Motive seems to be a 
legitimate substitute for intent, but, just as in criminal law, motive is not enough to establish guilt 
(Carpenter and Moss, 2014). Although their behavior corresponds to this motive, we do not know what 
their intentions are. Functionalist evidence is also not sufficient to pinpoint national parliament’s 
intentions. The literature on the use of the EWS by national parliaments would greatly benefit from 
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interviews with parliamentarians involved in the formulation of reasoned opinions and the analysis of 
documents in which relevant discussions among parliamentarians involved in the EWS are recorded. 
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